On the Origin and Consolidation of Hybrid Regimes: The State of Democracy in the Caucasus by Wheatley, Jonathan & Zürcher, Christoph
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
On the Origin and Consolidation of Hybrid Regimes: The State of
Democracy in the Caucasus
Wheatley, Jonathan; Zürcher, Christoph
Abstract: The regimes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, while broadly conforming to the category
of “hybrid regimes,” should not be treated as a half-way stage in a process of transition to democracy,
but rather as stable, based on the institutional structures of clientelism. The authors identify the origin
of these regimes and show how their emergence is, to a large extent, the consequence of the strategies
that the new rulers chose in order to secure their authority in the years following independence. Even in
Georgia, the recent “colored revolution” had little impact on the institutional parameters of the hybrid
regime. The quintessential features that underpin the hybrid regimes of the Caucasus are the clientelism
that constitutes the informal dynamic of these regimes and the “stickiness” of the informal institutions
that define state power. Given the specific internal and external constraints in which these regimes are
embedded, the degree of democracy that they have reached may be at an equilibrium outcome.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-98570
Originally published at:
Wheatley, Jonathan; Zürcher, Christoph (2008). On the Origin and Consolidation of Hybrid Regimes:
The State of Democracy in the Caucasus. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 4(1):1-31.
July 2008  |  
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.: -3
On the Origin and Consolidation of Hybrid Regimes
The State of Democracy in the Caucasus
Jonathan Wheatley and Christoph Zürcher
Abstract
The regimes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, while broadly conforming 
to the category of “hybrid regimes,” should not be treated as a half-way stage 
in a process of transition to democracy, but rather as stable, based on the 
institutional structures of clientelism. The authors identify the origin of these 
regimes and show how their emergence is, to a large extent, the consequence 
of the strategies that the new rulers chose in order to secure their authority 
in the years following independence. Even in Georgia, the recent “colored 
revolution” had little impact on the institutional parameters of the hybrid 
regime. The quintessential features that underpin the hybrid regimes of the 
Caucasus are the clientelism that constitutes the informal dynamic of these 
regimes and the “stickiness” of the informal institutions that define state power. 
Given the specific internal and external constraints in which these regimes 
are embedded, the degree of democracy that they have reached may be at an 
equilibrium outcome.
Key words:  hybrid regime, informal institutions, clientelism, democratization, 
parties, factionalism.
 
Almost two decades after the unmaking of the Soviet Empire, its successor 
states seem to fall into three distinct categories. First, there are the “good 
reformers.” These are fully consolidated liberal democracies that meet the most 
ambitious democratic requirements. They are integrated into Western economic 
and security institutions, most notably NATO and the EU. Admittedly, the list 
of “good reformers” is short: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
Then there are the bad reformers. These are nondemocratic regimes, some 
of them even outright authoritarian. The judiciary and the legislature are under 
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the control of a dominant executive, political and civil rights are limited, the 
media is tightly controlled, and civil society is weak and vulnerable. Political 
power is concentrated in the hands a few powerful patronage networks, which 
control the political process by a mix of clientelism, corruption, and repression. 
The champions of this cohort are Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, followed by 
Kazakhstan. But not only the Central Asian successor states belong to this 
group: Belarus, under the autocratic presidency of Aleksandr Lukashenko, is 
also part of this cohort, and Russia may soon be a member, too.
Finally, there are those in the middle. They are not as authoritarian or 
politically closed as Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, but they are certainly not 
liberal democracies like the Baltic states. There is diversity in this middle group: 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia are closer to the “good reformers,” 
whereas Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and, increasingly, Russia are 
closer to the “bad reformers.” It is noteworthy that all of these countries (with 
the exception of Russia, which is becoming steadily less democratic) seem to 
be locked in limbo. They have meandered back and forth, but always within 
a small corridor of about one point on the Freedom House Nations in Transit 
Democracy score. In sum, they seem to be rather stable and consolidated 
hybrid regimes (see table  below). 
The notion of a stable hybrid regime may at first sound like an oxymoron, 
and the many political crises that have surfaced in the Caucasus-the shooting 
in the parliament in Armenia in 999, the so-called Georgian Rose Revolution 
in 2003, and the contested presidential elections in Georgia and Armenia in 
Table .  Freedom House Nations in Transit 
Democracy Score, 2007
Country NIT Democracy Score
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Ukraine
Georgia
Moldova
Armenia
Kyrgyzstan
Russian Federation
Tajikistan
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
.96
2.07
2.29
4.25
4.68
4.96
5.2
5.68
5.86
5.96
6.00
6.39
6.68
6.82
6.96
Note: Freedom House scores range from  (most 
democratic) to 7 (least democratic).
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2008 that were either a response to (in Georgia) or led to (in Armenia) mass 
protests and a state of emergency certainly do not seem to imply political 
stability. Nevertheless, these regimes have retained their underlying structures 
and institutions and have therefore stabilized their political characteristics, 
despite these upheavals. It may very well be that these recurring instances of 
political crisis are a distinct symptom of hybrid regimes, rather than a sign of 
imminent change, as many well-meaning observers tend to believe.
During the last decade or so, there have been many important advances 
in the study of political regimes. To start with, it is by now widely accepted 
that hybrid regimes-those which are neither fully democratic nor fully 
authoritarian-are an important class of political regimes that deserve academic 
attention. Diamond finds that 39 percent of all political regimes are “hybrid” 
in the sense that they are neither liberal democracies nor politically closed 
authoritarian regimes (more on his classification below). Freedom House 2007 
classified fifty-eight countries of 193 as partly free, a category that denotes 
regimes that combine authoritarian and democratic features. Using Polity IV 
data, the Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM) counts in 2006 seventy-seven democratic countries, thirty-four 
autocracies, and forty-nine anocracies, which is another widely used term for 
in-between regimes.2
Many scholars have recently pointed to the fact that these hybrid regimes 
should not be treated as incomplete or transitional forms of democracy. 
Many such regimes, particularly in Africa and in the former Soviet Union, 
have stayed hybrid for a long time3 and have proved to be rather immune to 
change. Apparently, they can “form stable links to their economic and societal 
environment and are often seen by considerable parts of the elites and the 
population as an adequate institutional solution to the specific problems of 
governing ‘effectively.’ As long as this equilibrium between problems, context 
and power lasts, defective democracies will survive for protracted periods 
of time,” Merkel observes.4 If this is true, then the empirical study of hybrid 
regimes should focus particularly on their “survival condition.” If one wants 
to know why hybrid regimes can be so endurable, one needs to investigate the 
problems to which such regimes offer the solution. 
 Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes: Elections without Democracy,” Journal of 
Democracy 3, no. 2 (2002): 26. 
2 Joseph J. Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive 
Summary (College Park, MD: CIDCM Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management, University of Maryland, 2008).
3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 (2002): 5-65. Also see Thomas Carothers, 
“The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 3, no.  (2002): 5-2. 
4 Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization , no. 5 (2004): 
35.
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With the hybrid regime becoming an important subfield in the study 
of political regimes, there has also been much effort at developing more 
accurate classifications that go beyond the old dichotomy of democratic and 
authoritarian. At first, this led to what Levitsky and Collier, in 1997, referred to 
as “democracy with adjectives.”5 New qualifiers for democracy (authoritarian, 
neopatrimonial, pseudo-, proto-, delegated, defective, and so on) mushroomed, 
all highlighting one important aspect of the regime under scrutiny. Later 
attempts were made to categorize these subtypes into broader classification 
schemes. For example, Diamond proposes a useful classification scheme6 
that lists six categories of regime types, ranging from liberal democracies to 
politically closed authoritarian systems.7
This essay is concerned with two related questions: What are the origins 
of the hybrid regimes in the Caucasus, and what makes them persistent and 
consolidated? In what follows, we start by describing the state of democracy 
in the three states of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. First, we focus on 
the features of the political regime that place these regimes in the category 
of hybrids (albeit borderline hybrid-authoritarian in the case of Azerbaijan). 
Next, we trace the origins of these hybrid regimes by considering their specific 
trajectories in the three countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A 
5 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, Research Note, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (997): 430-45.
6 Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes: Elections without Democracy,” 2-35.
7 The first two categories are liberal democracy and electoral democracy. Both denote democratic 
regimes. But liberal democracies are fully democratic (with a Freedom House Democracy score 
of 2 and better). They meet the (Schumpeterian) minimalist requirements of democracy in the 
sense that the principal positions of power are filled through competitive struggle for the popular 
vote, but they must also meet more demanding requirements. Particularly, they must guarantee 
the freedoms (freedom of organization, expression, and information) that make elections 
meaningful. Electoral democracies meet only the minimalist requirements, but lack the broad 
civil liberties and the deep institutional embedding of democratic practices in liberal democracies. 
The next three categories are reserved for nondemocratic regimes: competitive authoritarian 
regimes, hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, and politically closed authoritarian regimes. 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the 
principal means of obtaining and exercising authority, but the regime does not meet minimal 
democratic requirements. Elections are neither fair nor free, but, nevertheless, they may be 
bitterly fought; there may be a parliamentarian opposition, or even a few independent media 
outlets (see also Levitsky and Way, “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism.” Hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes show much less competition 
in election, rarely face contestation by a parliamentary opposition, place media under central 
control, and ensure that the judiciary is dependent on the executive. Finally, politically closed 
authoritarian regimes face no contestation, and competition is virtually absent. The sixth and 
last category lumps together ambiguous regimes which are somewhere between electoral 
democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes. They fall on the blurry boundary between 
electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism and may meander back and forth, making 
it difficult for independent observers to agree over how to classify them. Applying this scheme, 
Diamond classifies Georgia and Armenia as ambiguous regimes and Azerbaijan as hegemonic 
electoral authoritarian.
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comparison with the Baltic states (the “good” reformers) is used in order 
to highlight some of the factors that led to the emergence of hybrids in the 
Caucasus. The third section focuses on what we call the second round of state-
building. After the turmoil of the immediate post-Soviet transition and the 
subsequent civil wars (988-993) came to an end, the ruling elites had to 
reconstruct central authority within their polities. We show that the emergence 
of hybrid regimes to a large extent is the immediate consequence of the 
strategies that the new rulers chose in order to secure their authority. In the 
fourth section, we speculate on why these regimes are protracted and stable. 
In this section, we also discuss the so-called Rose Revolution in Georgia-an 
instance of massive contestation that led to the replacement of the political 
elite, without changing the underlying structures. We conclude this essay with 
a brief discussion on the lessons that the study of the Caucasian hybrids hold 
for the wider study of democratization.
Hybrids in the Caucasus
Georgia and Armenia can be described as true hybrid regimes, while Azerbaijan 
is basically an authoritarian regime, with some elements of democracy. All 
three cases have maintained more or less the same levels of democracy over 
the last ten years, although there has been a slow slide toward the authoritarian 
end of the spectrum in all cases. Table 2 shows the Freedom House Nations in 
Transit scores for all three republics from 999 to 2007:
The defining features of the three regimes are the following: First, in 
all cases, there is a powerful executive, led by the president, which in many 
ways seems to have taken over the functions of the Soviet-era Communist 
Party. The presidency (i.e., the president, his administration, and the various 
informal networks that link him to individual officials) fulfils many of the 
functions that the all-powerful Central Committee of the Communist Party 
fulfilled yesteryear.8 Overall, it is proximity to the president-whether 
Table 2. Freedom House Nations in Transit Democracy Scores, 999-2007
999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Armenia 4.79 - 4.83 4.83 4.92 5.00 5.8 5.4 5.2
Azerbaijan 5.58 - 5.63 5.54 5.46 5.63 5.86 5.93 6.00
Georgia 4.7 - 4.33 4.58 4.83 4.83 4.96 4.86 4.68
8 Jonathan Wheatley, “Georgia’s Democratic Stalemate,” openDemocracy.net, April 14, 2008, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/caucasus_fractures/georgia_
democratic_stalemate.
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formally through membership in the presidential administration, or informally 
through close personal connections-that determines the political influence of 
an individual bureaucrat. The presidential networks (again both formal and 
informal) have more influence than either parliament or even the cabinet of 
ministers, undermining any checks and balances that can be brought to bear 
on the executive.
After the passage of the Constitution in 995, the presidency in Georgia was 
reestablished and power henceforth rested primarily with the State Chancellery 
(presidential administration). The State Chancellery, although it had little power 
on paper, in many ways resembled the old Central Committee; its departments, 
and even the individuals who manned them, were very much a reproduction of 
the old Communist Party bureaucracy.9 After the Rose Revolution, the State 
Chancellery was disbanded and two separate organizations were created: a 
presidential administration and a cabinet office (effectively the administration 
of the prime minister). However, real power rested with President Saakashvili’s 
close networks, composed of individuals whose influence did not so much 
derive from their official positions, as from the close connections they 
developed with Saakashvili as a result of their work in the NGO sector during 
the Shevardnadze period. In Azerbaijan, the presidential administration is also 
dominant and is headed by the former secretary for ideology in the Azerbaijan 
Communist Party, Ramiz Mehtiev. The informal networks extending from the 
president and the presidential administration control all economic life (formal 
and informal), including the vital oil sector.0 In Armenia, it is not so much 
the formal presidential administration that dominates but the networks that 
radiate from the current and former presidents, Serzh Sarkisian and Robert 
Kocharian.
Second, political parties in the Caucasian states are a feature of the political 
elite alone and are largely irrelevant to society. In all three cases, at various 
points in time, a relatively formalized “party of power” has been established 
that mirrors the old Communist Party to the extent that it is the dominant 
party that represents the authorities and is a means whereby state employees, 
businessmen, and intellectuals can join the main networks of power. At the 
same time, it fails to penetrate society in the way that the Communist Party 
used to. Azerbaijan’s ruling party, Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan), founded 
9 One of the most powerful posts within the State Chancellery was that of secretary of the Security 
Council, which oversaw all matters of defense and security. The post was held by Nugzar Sajaia 
from the council’s inception in 1996 until his suicide on February 25, 2002. Sajaia had previously 
held equivalent posts in Communist Party structures; he had been head of the department of 
administrative structures and later head of the department of organizational party work in the 
Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party.
0 International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?” International Crisis Group 
Europe Report 15, May 3, 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm? id=2752&l=.
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in 992 by Heydar Aliyev, has been the dominant force in the country since 
Aliyev took power in June 1993, and has controlled Azerbaijan’s parliament 
since the 995 parliamentary elections. In Georgia, two ruling parties have 
governed in succession: the first was the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG), 
founded in 993 by Eduard Shevardnadze and Zurab Zhvania, which won a 
parliamentary majority in both the 995 and 999 parliamentary elections, 
while the second was the United National Movement, formed through a union 
of Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement and Zurab Zhvania’s United 
Democrats in November 2004. Finally, in Armenia, the Armenian National 
Movement (ANM) constituted a ruling party under the leadership of Levon 
Ter Petrosian and dominated political life in Armenia from 99 until 998. 
Following Ter Petrosian’s ouster, Robert Kocharian’s new Karabakh elite 
(see below) has been represented by the Republican Party, although it has 
shared power with a number of smaller factions, most notably the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (ARF, or Dashnaks). It is not ideology that defines 
the “party of power,” but proximity to the authorities. The rapid collapses 
of the ANM following Ter Petrosian’s ouster, and of the CUG following 
Shevardnadze’s resignation as chairman of the party in September 2001, 
demonstrate that a “party of power” cannot survive without the patronage of 
the president.
Similarly, opposition parties are poorly institutionalized, mainly 
nonideological and charisma-based, and highly dependent on their leaders. 
They have little if any organized grass-roots support. Typically, they are 
established-often as parliamentary factions-by former members of the 
political elite after an acrimonious break with the president and his entourage. 
This was the case with Saakashvili’s National Movement, established at the 
end of 2001, shortly after Saakashvili’s break with Shevardnadze and his 
resignation as justice minister. Similarly, one of Azerbaijan’s main opposition 
parties, Musavat, is led by Isa Gambar, who had been chairman of parliament 
during Abulfaz Elchibey’s short-lived government from 1992 to 1993. In 
Armenia, Orinats Yerkir was one of the main opposition parties contesting the 
May 2007 parliamentary elections; its leader is Artur Bagdasaryan, the former 
speaker of the National Assembly and former loyalist of President Robert 
Kocharian. Another main opposition party is the Heritage Party, led by former 
minister of foreign affairs, Raffi Hovanissian.
Few parties, whether progovernment or opposition, have either a distinct 
ideological platform or a clear constituency of supporters within society. Most 
parties are ephemeral and their fate depends on the (often short) political lives 
of their leaders. Voters, therefore, vote either for “the authorities” or for a 
particular opposition leader whom they like, without any clear idea of what in 
terms of policies they are voting for-a state of affairs that is hardly conducive 
to a participatory democracy.
Third, elections are held not to provide voters with a real choice of policy 
alternatives from which to choose, but instead to confer a stamp of legitimacy 
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on the incumbent regime. It is noteworthy that the only elections to result in 
a turnover of power in the newly independent states of the Caucasus were the 
first-ever truly competitive elections to be held, and even then this occurred 
only in Armenia (parliamentary elections on May 20, 990) and in Georgia 
(parliamentary elections on October 28, 990)-resulting in the defeat of the 
incumbent Communist Party. In Georgia, the new leadership remained in 
power only for a little more than a year before being overthrown, and former 
Communist Party first secretary Eduard Shevardnadze returned to power as 
a result. In Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov was overthrown by forces loyal to 
the opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front in 992, but not through elections. 
All subsequent changeovers of power have not come about through elections 
either: in Armenia, Robert Kocharian replaced Levon Ter Petrosian in 998 
after a “palace coup”; in Azerbaijan, Popular Front leader Abulfaz Elchibey 
was forced out in 993, after just a year in power, by an armed insurrection 
and replaced as president by Heidar Aliyev, and later-in 2003-Ilham Aliyev 
replaced his father Heidar as a result of the latter’s ill health and subsequent 
death; in Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili replaced Eduard Shevardnadze in 
April 2003 after a popular uprising or “revolution.” An election “anointed” 
the replacement of Robert Kocharian as president by Serzh Sarkisian in 2008, 
but Sarkisian was the hand-picked successor of Kocharian and no true rotation 
of power took place. Elections have therefore played little role in determining 
who rules in the post-communist countries of the Caucasus.
Typically, elections are a means by which the authorities can, in the words 
of Andrew Wilson, “fake democracy.” During elections, the ruling party and 
the incumbent political elite are able to draw on the financial resources of the 
state-both formal and informal-in order to ensure victory for the party in 
parliamentary elections and for their patron-the president-in presidential 
elections. Victory is gained by a variety of means, ranging from more or less 
legitimate campaigning, supported in most cases by largely favorable media 
coverage, to the use of “soft” administrative resources, such as providing 
electricity, fuel, and other public goods shortly before elections, to the 
sponsoring of “false opposition parties” to capture the votes of discontents, 
and even to outright falsification and fraud. All Caucasian countries have used 
a mixture of all these “technologies” to win elections, although they differ in 
the ratio of technologies used. It is difficult to “grade” elections in terms of 
how free and fair they are; nevertheless, some attempt can be made to do so by 
referring to election monitoring reports from the OSCE Office of Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), most of which provide the proportion 
of polling stations visited, in which (a) the voting procedure, and (b) the vote 
 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2005).
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count, is graded either as “poor” or “very poor.” Table 3 shows the proportion 
of polling stations falling into these categories in sixteen elections in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
Table 3 provides an idea of the cruder forms of election manipulation, 
namely disruption of voting procedures and falsification of the vote count. 
These cruder forms of vote rigging occurred in all Caucasian countries, 
although they were significantly more predominant in Azerbaijan. The lack of 
an institutionalized party system in the Caucasian republics makes elections 
a zero-sum game and therefore prone to manipulation and abuse. Neither 
“parties of power” nor defeated presidents will survive a period of opposition 
and the bureaucrats who manage elections at the local level depend on the 
president and the ruling party for their positions. There is therefore a very 
strong incentive for these bureaucrats to “deliver the correct result.” Given 
the prevalence of graft and clientelism in government (see below), defeated 
power-holders even risk prosecution for corruption or misuse of power (as 
Table 3.  OSCE Election Observations: Evaluation of Voting and Counting 
Procedures
Country Election Date Polling Station:Poor/Very Poor %
Count:
Poor/Very Poor %
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Armenia
Armenia
Armenia
Armenia
Armenia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
Parliamentary
Presidential
05/2/08 
0/05/08
03/28/04
0/04/04 
/02/03 
04/09/00
0/3/99
02/9/08
05/2/07 
05/25/03
02/9/03
05/30/99 
03/6/983
/06/05
0/5/03
/05/00
  8
  7
  4
  3
9
6
2
  5
  6
02
2
0
4
3
26
24
22
23
5
3
3
48
24
6
34
332
n/a
22
3
4
552
52
Notes:  1.  No data available for the count itself; this figure refers to the tabulation of 
results.
2.  For these observations, the standard categories “Very Good,” “Good, “Poor,” 
and “Very Poor” were replaced by the categories “No problems,” “Minor 
problems,” “A few significant problems,” and “Many significant problems.”
3.  In each case, there were two rounds of elections as no candidates won 50 
percent in the first round. Figures given are the averages of the two rounds.
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occurred with some of Shevardnadze’s acolytes in the aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution), further discouraging them from countenancing electoral defeat.
Fourth, social organizations-or what is commonly known as civil society-
play little role in determining the evolution of the political regime. It is true 
that at certain critical junctures-the Rose Revolution being a prime example-
society appears to mobilize; however, it is unable to do so autonomously. 
NGOs make up most of what is referred to as civil society, and these are either 
dependent on Western funding or (in the case of government-affiliated NGOs 
or GONGOs) rely on government patronage. The NGO sector has been strong 
in Georgia, where a few NGOs with close links to Mikheil Saakashvili’s 
National Movement (the most prominent of which was the Liberty Institute), 
were instrumental in mobilizing protestors in the Rose Revolution of 2003. 
NGOs are probably weakest in Azerbaijan, where those with an agenda that 
may loosely be described as political face strong pressure from the authorities. 
While NGOs have been allowed to develop relatively freely in Georgia and 
Armenia, they have tended to represent only an elitist pro-Western fringe 
of society and have little to do with ordinary citizens. Broad-based sectoral 
organizations, such as trade unions, remain weak in all three cases. In none 
of the three cases has civil society effectively played the role of organized 
intermediary between society and the state. 
The media, too, by and large, has been unable to bring the executive to 
account. Although a plethora of independent newspapers exists in all three 
countries, many with pro-opposition viewpoints (although these frequently 
face censure in Azerbaijan), journalistic standards are low and investigative 
journalism is virtually nonexistent. Television-both public and private-
has typically been under the direct or indirect control of the authorities. An 
exception is Georgia, where a major private media holding-Rustavi 2-sided 
with Mikheil Saakashvili’s opposition National Movement against President 
Shevardnadze in the run-up to the 2003 parliamentary elections and during 
the Rose Revolution. Rustavi 2’s role is believed to have been crucial to the 
success of the Rose Revolution.2 Similarly, by 2007, another private television 
station, Imedi, had become the focus of opposition to Mikheil Saakashvili.3 
In Armenia, A1 Plus, the most influential opposition-leaning independent TV 
station and a kind of Armenian equivalent of Rustavi-2, had its frequency 
2 Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition 
in the Former Soviet Union (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005).
3 However, following the nine-day state of emergency in Georgia in November 2007, during 
which much of Imedi’s equipment was smashed, and the subsequent death of the company’s 
owner, Badri Patarkatsishvili, in February 2008, Imedi entered a period of deep crisis, and, at 
the time of writing, was not broadcasting either news or political analysis. The small Kavkasia 
television channel was left alone to represent the opposition, although it is unable to broadcast 
outside Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi.
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assigned to another channel and went off the air in April 2002 as a result of 
pressure from the authorities. Azerbaijan similarly lacks any pro-opposition or 
even independent television channel.
Finally, and this is a factor that applies to Georgia and Armenia far more 
than it applies to Azerbaijan, the political elite is factionalized within itself 
and it is this, not the party system, that is the defining feature of pluralism in 
these two countries. In Georgia, Shevardnadze’s political elite was divided 
among: () an economic elite, made up of well-connected businessmen and 
financiers, many of whom had links with the president’s family; (2) leftovers 
from the Soviet regime, made up of former colleagues from Komsomol or 
higher Communist Party structures; and (3) a younger generation of mainly 
Western-educated lawyers and scholars with close links to some of Georgia’s 
more powerful NGOs. After the Rose Revolution, this pluralism was less 
overt but still remained, with simmering conflicts among the so-called Liberty 
Institute group (former activists of one such NGO), former colleagues of the 
late Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, and a small circle of associates close to the 
parliamentary speaker, Nino Burjanadze. In Armenia, it was a schism with the 
Yerkrapah Union of war veterans, founded by Defense Minister Sarkisian and 
made up of men who had participated in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that 
led to the removal of President Levon Ter Petrosian in 998. Other “competing 
teams” were said to exist, including those clustered around Ter Petrosian 
himself, his brother Telman, Minister of the Interior Vano Siradeghian, and 
Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisian.4 Subsequently, a new schism developed 
between Yerkrapah and the Karabakh elite of the new president, Robert 
Kocharian, and his defense minister, Serzh Sarkisian, resulting in the gradual 
marginalization of the former. Factionalism also exists in Azerbaijan, with 
two “regional strategic groups” having been identified within the political 
elite-one that has become associated with Azerbaijanis whose families were 
resettled to Azerbaijan from Armenia during the Soviet period and earlier in 
the twentieth century (known as the Yeraz or “Ermenistanis”), and another 
made up of individuals native to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic 
of Azerbaijan (the Nakhichevanis).5 However, these two factions seem to 
have been deliberately nurtured by President Heidar Aliyev to ensure his 
own continued dominance through the principle of divide-and-rule, and it is 
questionable whether they can be compared with the relatively autonomous 
elite factions in Armenia and Georgia.
4 Nora Dudwick, “Political Transformations in Postcommunist Armenia,” in Conflict, Cleavage, 
and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 997).
5 International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?” International Crisis 
Group Europe Report 156, May 3, 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/ index.cfm? 
id=2752&l=.
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In most cases, the factionalism that is inherent within the political elite is 
not reflected in the party system. In Georgia from 1994 to 2001 and 2004 to the 
present day, in Armenia under Ter Petrosian, and in Azerbaijan since Heidar 
Aliyev’s return in 1993, the various factions have been held together within the 
structure of the ruling party and by the presidential administration. In Armenia 
under Robert Kocharian, certain factions have had their own political parties, 
although these parties have remained mostly loyal to the dominant Republican 
Party.6
The factionalism described above does not refer to the sort of institutional 
divides that can provide the checks and balances that are necessary for any 
democracy, for example, a conflict between the legislature and the executive or 
between the judiciary and other branches of power. Members of the ruling party 
faction in the legislature simply follow the instructions of the leadership of the 
faction in parliament or those of the president. If the leadership fragments, 
individual members of parliament follow the lead of their “patrons”; thus, 
when the CUG collapsed in Georgia, MPs from that faction either joined pro-
Shevardnadze factions, or those of Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania. 
Similarly, in Armenia, when Ter Petrosian was facing opposition from 
Yerkrapah in 1997-1998, MPs from the Armenian National Movement merely 
shifted their allegiances from Ter Petrosian to Kocharian. The judiciary also 
has been very weak as an independent counterbalance to executive power; it 
lacks organizational autonomy and courts tend to follow the old tradition of 
the Peoples’ Courts of the Soviet period and all too often succumb to pressure 
from the presidency or the Prosecutor’s Office. In particular, the Councils of 
Justice in Georgia and Armenia, which play a supervisory and disciplinary role 
over the judiciary, have been highly dependent on the president; in Georgia, the 
president chaired the council, while in Armenia, he appointed all its members, 
although in both cases constitutional changes passed in June 2005 have 
weakened this dependency somewhat. Similarly, in Azerbaijan, the Judicial-
Legal Council (equivalent to the Council of Justice) includes a representative 
of the Prosecutor’s Office, and, in Georgia, the Prosecutor General was a 
member of the Council of Justice until June 2006. In all of these countries, 
therefore, the judiciary has been a part of the presidential vertical hierarchical 
power structure and has been unable to effectively ensure that the executive 
follows the rule of law.
To summarize, within the regimes in place in the three Caucasian 
republics, political change is born not through pressure from the citizenry, as 
in a democracy, but out of intra-elite power struggles. This even applies to 
6 An exception here is the Orinats Yerkir Party, which was loyal to the authorities during the 2003 
parliamentary elections but subsequently split and competed as an opposition party in the 2007 
election.
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Georgia during the Rose Revolution, when the cleavage within the political 
elite was the primary factor behind the changes, while mass mobilization was 
used merely as a resource by the most successful of the factions. In all three 
cases, a ruling elite (or oligarchy) holds power and does all it can to retain 
it, while at the same time observing some minimal democratic procedures. 
The oligarchy, despite enjoying a monopoly of power, is subject to opposition, 
especially in Georgia and Armenia, both from within its own ranks (through 
factionalization) and from some form of legalized opposition movement(s). 
However, the formal democratic procedures that do exist in these regimes 
(such as voting) have no real influence; it is only struggles among elites that 
can change the distribution of political power.
The Making of the Hybrids I: 1989-1993
The early days of democratic transition in the Caucasus were marked by three 
factors that set these transitions apart from other cases of political transitions: 
() the struggle for (domestic) liberalization was subordinated to the overriding 
demand for (external) liberation from Soviet rule; (2) the demise of the Soviet 
Union led to a total devaluation all state capacities, affecting every aspect of 
societal and political life; and, finally, (3) on top of state weakness came civil 
wars that affected all three countries. Before we move on to describe at greater 
length the individual trajectories of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, let us 
briefly elaborate on these three factors.
First, the process of democratization was intrinsically linked to the quest 
for national liberation, and both went hand-in-hand with unprecedented ethno-
nationalist mobilization. By 989, challenges to the incumbent communist 
regime had proliferated all over the Soviet Empire. The Baltic republics took 
the lead, but nationalist mobilization soon spilled over to other republics of the 
USSR. On February 22, 988, thirty thousand demonstrators rallied on Theater 
Square in Yerevan, Armenia. Three days later, on February 25, there were 
around one million demonstrators-about a quarter of the total population. 
In Georgia, the nationalist opposition mobilized up to 200,000 demonstrators 
by November 988, and by January 990 in Azerbaijan, there were at least 
a quarter of a million demonstrators on Lenin Square in central Baku. Much 
of the political energy that was set free by the mass movements was directed 
against what was perceived by many as foreign Soviet domination. Surfing on 
the wave of nationalist mobilization, oppositional elites in Armenia and Georgia 
won the first free elections in 1990 and took over the state; in Azerbaijan, 
the old communist regime hung onto power only because it manipulated the 
elections, but it eventually collapsed in 992 under intense pressure from 
the nationalist opposition. It was ethnic nationalism focused on liberation 
from external domination that provided a mass base for the democratizing 
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movements, voiced the strongest demands for liberalization, and shaped post-
Soviet civic life.7
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the transition to democracy took 
place in an environment which was marked by a near complete devaluation of 
state capacities. The collapse of the Soviet Empire was not only the collapse 
of a regime but also it was the unmaking of the whole institutional framework 
that had held the empire together. The successor states of the Soviet Union 
suffered a double state weakness: the weakness of the moribund Soviet state 
was paralleled by the incapacity of the new, emerging independent states. The 
disruptive regime transitions had paralyzed Soviet (central) state institutions, 
while the young successor states of the Soviet Union were not yet capable of 
effectively carrying out key state functions. Many accounts of the unmaking of 
the Soviet Union and the emergence of the successor states focus predominantly 
on the processes of liberalization and democratization that spilled over from 
the center to the republics, eventually enabling the “national revolutions” 
in Georgia, Armenia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and Russia, but they tend to 
underrate the impact of the sudden loss in state capacities that all successor 
polities experienced. Imagine a state that has no army and no defense ministry, 
no internal security forces, no working communication lines, and no tax 
revenues. Moreover, in this state, intense competition between incumbent and 
challenging elites rages over the future of the state and especially over the 
crafting of its political institutions. Further, the population is highly mobilized 
and carries politics onto the streets and into the squares of the capital. This, 
in a nutshell, is how the successor states of the Soviet Union looked between 
989 and 992.
Finally, the tide of nationalist mobilization and the devaluation of state 
capacity led to another peculiarity that sets the Caucasian cases apart from other 
post-Soviet cases (with the exception of Tajikistan, Moldova, and Chechnya). 
All three Caucasian republics spiralled into ethno-political violence.8 From 
988 to 994, a war was fought between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over 
the mainly ethnic Armenian territory of Nagorny Karabakh, which was an 
autonomous territory within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. The demand of 
the Karabakh Armenians to be annexed to the neighboring Soviet Republic of 
Armenia led to a forced exchange of population and then to a bitter war between 
the Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan. At least twenty thousand soldiers and 
civilians were killed, and hundreds of thousands, mainly Azerbajianis from 
7 Mark Beissinger, “Ethnic Identity and Democratization: Lessons from the Post-Soviet Region,” 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 (2007): 73-99. Also see Mark Beissinger, Nationalist 
Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).
8 Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the 
Post-Soviet Era (New York: New York University Press, 2007).
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Karabakh, were internally displaced (which, in this case, is a euphemism for 
being ethnically cleansed). In Georgia, a series of three interrelated wars took 
place between 1989 and 1993. The first war was over the breakaway region of 
South Ossetia (99-992); the second war was fought between rival Georgian 
groups bidding for political power and was triggered by the violent overthrow 
of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia by a coalition of opposition politicians 
and warlords (end of 99 to 993); while the third was over the breakaway 
Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (1992-1993). The conflicts over South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia remain formally unresolved to the present day. In both 
cases, the secessionist entities have asserted themselves militarily, but have 
failed to gain international recognition.
Why did the Caucasian republics spiral into war and emerge as hybrid 
regimes? And why, by contrast, did the Baltic states avoid violence and 
become liberal democracies? What made their transition so different and so 
successful? 
Interestingly, the usual suspect-ethnicity-is not the culprit. Neither the 
salience of ethnic identity nor ethnic demography can explain the different 
outcomes. In the Baltic states, ethnic identity was no weaker than in Armenia 
and Georgia, and arguably stronger than in Azerbaijan. Attendance at 
demonstrations against Soviet “occupation” equalled or exceeded that in the 
Caucasian states. Neither can ethnic demography account for the differences. 
Estonia and Latvia both had significant minorities (38 percent and 48 percent, 
respectively), while Lithuania had a relatively small minority population 
(20 percent). Georgia’s minority population accounted for 30 percent of the 
overall population, whereas Azerbaijan (8 percent) and Armenia (7 percent) 
were ethnically very homogeneous.9 On average, therefore, the percentage of 
ethnic minorities in the Baltic states exceeded that in the Caucasus. Against the 
backdrop of this ethnic demographic data, one has to agree with Beissinger20 
in concluding that ethnic diversity is a weak explanation of democratic 
development on its own. Rather, ethnicity exercises its effects on processes of 
transition in interaction with other factors.
National mobilization in the Baltics was as strong as that in the Caucasus, 
no less anti-Soviet, and realized earlier. But in contrast with the Caucasus, 
nationalist mobilization was promoted by a de facto coalition between the so-
called reform communists and the leaders of the broad national movements (or 
Popular Fronts). Although more radical movements existed, they by and large 
were marginalized by this coalition, and it was this that enabled the Baltic states 
to avoid sharp elite cleavages and internal fragmentation. Furthermore, elites 
9 Figures are taken from the 989 population census of the USSR.
20 Beissinger, “Ethnic Identity and Democratization. Lessons from the Post-Soviet Region.” 
6  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.
and population broadly agreed on the direction and end stage of the transition: 
Theirs was to be a European state, firmly anchored in the EU and NATO.
By contrast, the Georgian national movement was radicalized, internally 
fragmented, and unable to engage in any (if only tactical) compromise with 
the incumbent communist elites. The communist authorities became totally 
discredited after Soviet forces dispersed a demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, 
989, leaving nineteen people dead and hundreds injured. As a result, the national 
opposition became more radicalized and moderate voices were completely 
sidelined, making it no longer possible to create a Popular Front along Baltic 
lines.2 In contrast to the Baltic republics, it was the radical opposition that 
gained the upper hand in Georgia, not the (relative) moderates.
Furthermore, when in October 990 the nationalist “Round Table-Free 
Georgia” bloc, under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was elected to 
power, the new regime was bitterly contested in two autonomous territories 
of Georgia, the autonomous republic of Abkhazia and the autonomous region 
(oblast, or province) of South Ossetia. Counter-mobilizations by ethnic 
Georgians, on the one hand, and ethnic Abkhaz and Ossets, on the other, soon 
spiralled out of control. By the end of 990, Georgia was falling apart. South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia were mainly outside Tbilisi’s control, the Georgian 
national movement was deeply divided, and paramilitary “pro-fatherland” 
groups were operating largely unchecked. On May 26, 99, Gamsakhurdia 
was elected president with over 86 percent of the vote. He lasted less than 
a year in office before being ousted by an unlikely coalition of paramilitary 
factions, intelligentsia, and Soviet-era nomenklatura in January 992. The new 
leadership, dominated by warlords, invited former Georgian Communist Party 
boss Eduard Shevardnadze back to the country to give the new government 
a veneer of legitimacy. Before Shevardnadze could wrest full control of the 
country from the paramilitaries, another devastating war lost Georgia all 
remaining control over Abkhazia. By the end of 993, both South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia remained de facto independent.
Things unfolded differently in Armenia, but with equally unfortunate 
consequences. In Armenia, the national movement rapidly gained the upper 
hand over the Soviet nomenklatura. The process of mobilization was almost 
exclusively inspired by the quest for unification of Karabakh with Armenia. 
The Karabakh issue had an immense mobilizing force, but also a unifying 
effect. In Armenia, the struggle for power was hardly ever confrontational. 
As in the Baltic republics, nationalist challengers gradually took over the 
Soviet institutions and “nationalized” them, while the old elites, after a slight 
2 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the 
Former Soviet Union, 45.
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hesitation, adopted the positions of the opposition. The Armenian “revolution” 
was-internally-a peaceful one.22 On the most important (and soon the 
only) political question, that of Karabakh, there were no strategic differences 
between incumbents and challengers. In the first free elections to the Supreme 
Soviet of the Republic of Armenia, which took place in the summer of 990, 
the Armenian National Movement won a majority of seats, and Levon Ter 
Petrossian was elected chairman of the parliament in July. But the national 
movement had taken over a country that was at war. Since February 988, a 
low-intensity war had been fought in Karabakh, which escalated into a full-
blown international war as the Soviet Union broke up.
The issue of Karabakh also shaped the transition in Azerbaijan. But in 
contrast to Armenia, “Karabakh” never became a factor that would bridge 
the rifts between the communist regime and the nationalist opposition. Quite 
to the opposite: Karabakh became a political playing field, on which regime 
and opposition tried to score points off each other. Unlike both Georgia and 
Armenia, the well-entrenched communist regime in Azerbaijan resisted the 
nationalist movement and remained in power until 992. The sharp cleavages 
between incumbent and oppositional elites hindered an efficient execution of 
the war in Karabakh and led to a serious military defeat in the town of Lachin, 
allowing the Armenian side to establish a corridor between Karabakh and 
Armenia. It was defeat on the battle field that eventually brought down the 
communist regime. In May 1992, Ayaz Mutalibov was finally overthrown by 
the Popular Front in a bloodless, and to a large extent peaceful, coup, and the 
leader of the Popular Front, Abulfez Elchibey, was elected president. But when 
in early 993 Armenian forces defeated Azerbaijani forces in the northern part 
of Karabakh, the president was faced with an imminent coup against him. He 
turned for help to the gray eminence of Azerbaijani politics, Heydar Aliyev, 
former member of the Politburo and long-time first secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Aliyev initially allowed 
himself to be co-opted as the fifty-first member of the fifty-member-strong 
parliament, and was then elected chairman. He organized a plebiscite against 
Elchibey, which ended with a clear vote of no-confidence in the president. 
Aliyev won the following presidential elections with a solid Soviet result of 
98.8 percent, on a voter turnout of 90 percent. Thus began the Aliyev era, 
which brought Azerbaijan a stable, yet undemocratic regime.
It is time to briefly sum up the Caucasian misadventures, as compared to 
the Baltic states. What derailed a peaceful transition in Georgia (which might 
have cleared the way for the establishment of a liberal democracy) was neither 
ethnic demography per se, nor the ethno-national character of the national 
22 Gerard J. Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking since 
Independence (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 999), 20.
8  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.
movement. Rather, it was the fact that the challenging nationalist elites were 
radicalized (and, hence, no pact with reform communists was possible) and 
highly noncohesive, which prevented regime consolidation. Furthermore, 
and perhaps more importantly, the new nationalist power-holders in Georgia 
were challenged by equally staunch nationalist elites in two of Georgia’s three 
autonomous entities. Ethnic mobilization of Georgians, on the one hand, and of 
Abkhaz and Ossetians, on the other, soon grew into an interdependent process 
in which each action produced a counter-reaction. Mobilization spiralled out 
of control and led to civil war.
In Armenia, transition could have gone the Baltic way. There were no 
unbridgeable rifts between incumbents and challengers, and the national 
movement was highly cohesive. But whereas in the Baltic states the 
cohesiveness of the new national elite, the pact between old and new elites, 
and the widespread popular support for the national project were centered on 
“Europe,” in Armenia, they were centered around “Karabakh.” In the Baltic 
states, integration into Europe could be achieved only by tempering radical 
nationalism and by aiming for high standards of governance. In Armenia, 
“Karabakh” soon turned into a bitter war that could be won only by total national 
mobilization, and by giving a free hand to those who were able to successfully 
organize a desperate war. As a result, the prospects for establishing a liberal 
democracy were badly damaged.
Finally, in Azerbaijan, the national movement lacked the power that it 
had in Georgia, Armenia, and the Baltic. It was strong enough to challenge 
incumbents, but it was not strong enough to stay in power and consolidate the 
regime. Its rule lasted for less than a year. In the course of the political struggle 
between the communist elite and its nationalist challengers between 989 and 
993, the communist elite applied many unconstitutional means, ranging from 
manipulation of elections to the creation of unconstitutional political bodies 
to exercise the use of force. During this process, the institutional base for 
democratic governance was eroded. When Heidar Aliyev took over in 993, he 
was able to start to build the “Aliyev system,” which lasts to the present day.
The Making of Hybrids II: Regime Reconstruction after 1993
Between 989 and 993, all three Caucasian countries had undergone a 
profound transformation from Soviet republics to independent and formally 
democratic states. Yet in many respects, they had to start all over again in 
993, under circumstances which were not conducive to the establishment of 
genuine democratic practices. All three republics had suffered dramatically 
from the consequences of the wars, both in terms of horrendous human costs 
and in terms of the damage that war and civil strife had caused to the nascent 
political institutions. None of the three states possessed a viable bureaucratic 
structure, or anything distantly reassembling what Michael Mann would 
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describe as infrastructural power.23 The political institutions of the new polities 
were very weak and vulnerable. Rulers were far from being secure from coups. 
In fact, elected presidents in Georgia and Azerbaijan (i.e., Gamsakhurdia and 
Elchibey) had been overthrown. Armenia was in a permanent state of national 
mobilization. Security concerns dominated the political process, and the 
country was essentially run by those capable of organizing war, unchecked by 
democratic control. 
Such was the setting when, in 993, the political elite embarked on state-
building, round two. The hybrid regimes that emerged have their origins 
much more in the postwar situation of 993 than in the immediate post-Soviet 
period. As we will argue below, of particular importance was the way in which 
political elites reconstructed their authority after 993.
Central state authority had virtually disappeared in Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
In both countries, an unlikely coalition of politicians and warlord-type militia 
leaders brought back seasoned Soviet power-brokers in order to prevent a total 
collapse. In Georgia, it was Eduard Shevardnadze who was called to the rescue. 
In Azerbaijan, Heidar Aliyev took the helm. Both had in common a long and 
distinguished career in the most powerful Soviet institutions, having been 
Communist Party first secretaries of their respective republics. However, they 
faced an immense challenge. In reestablishing central authority, would they 
sideline or co-opt the various warlords, regional power-brokers, entrepreneurs 
of the shadow economy, and leaders of the political opposition?
Given his precariously weak position, Shevardnadze relied heavily on 
co-optation; he gave state posts to local power-holders who either had the 
potential to act as “spoilers” or had powerful networks that could be used 
to bargain, threaten, or cajole potential “spoilers” into not rocking the boat. 
Second, he sought to reactivate the old networks with which he was familiar-
mainly party and Komsomol (the communist youth organization, an important 
network for future cadres during the Soviet Union). Third, he rehabilitated the 
old Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), of which the police were the 
most visible and influential part. As a union-republic ministry (i.e., one that 
had had some autonomous existence at union-republic level), the MoIA had 
not been “decapitated” by the collapse of the Soviet state and could therefore 
be restored relatively easily. Shevardnadze also felt that he could neutralize 
the paramilitary groups by co-opting low- and middle-ranking members of 
their number into the police.24 Finally, he placed Georgia’s most important 
economic assets in the hands of a group of trusted associates, most of whom 
were close to his own family.
23 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” 
Archives Europa Sociologica 25 (984): 85-23.
24 Shevardnadze believed in the police, having himself occupied the post of Georgian Minister of 
Internal Affairs from 965 to 972.
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These old networks and reincarnations of Georgia’s (Soviet) past were 
to form the basis of the state administration both in the capital and in the 
regions. Once he had reestablished the MoIA as an effective instrument of 
state coercion, defeated the paramilitaries, and established a degree of control 
over most regions, Shevardnadze’s position was far more secure. In November 
995, he was elected president with almost 75 percent of the vote. Only in 
those geographical regions in which central authority was weak did he still 
rely on co-optation. For example, in the mainly Armenian-populated region of 
Javakheti, he ceded power to local Armenian networks that wielded significant 
economic power through their control over the local oil and gas business.
Although Shevardnadze had made major steps toward consolidating his 
authority after the chaos of the early 990s, he was never able to complete this 
process of consolidation, and retained power by maintaining a delicate balance 
between various alliances of actors with conflicting aims. These included 
his own inner circle (mainly members of his family and their allies), who 
controlled Georgia’s largest banks and businesses; a network of former district 
Communist Party bosses and former Komsomol activists, whom he had put 
in charge of the regions; and a younger elite, who formed the parliamentary 
leadership of the newly established “party of power,” the Citizens’ Union of 
Georgia, which dominated parliament after the 995 elections.
In neighboring Azerbaijan, Heidar Aliyev used many of the same tools 
to secure his position. He relied on his old networks, sidelining challengers 
where possible, and co-opting them where necessary. However, he was less 
restrained than Shevardnadze, and, hence, did not need to rely so much on 
co-option and concessions to his opponents. There were various reasons for 
this. First, warlord-type militia commanders had acquired strong positions 
in Georgia and controlled a large part of the state apparatus (such as it was) 
until 995. In Azerbaijan, on the other hand, militias were a serious security 
problem but had not completely suborned the state. Second, ethnic minorities 
needed to be placated in Georgia, while, in Azerbaijan, the population of 
ethnic minorities was small and insignificant after the forced exodus of the 
Armenians. Third, Georgia, far more than Azerbaijan, had its own distinctive 
classe politque, which was known both for its incessant internecine feuding 
and for its resistance to control by the central authorities. Many members of 
this class had sharpened their political teeth during the period of nationalist 
mobilization between 988 and 99.
There are two more reasons why Aliyev succeeded much more than 
Shevardnadze in establishing a centralized and closely-knit patron-client 
system that was firmly under his own personal control. First, Shevardnadze 
was a Soviet politician of the Gorbachev mold, who was prepared to 
countenance at least limited democratization, while Aliyev was very much of 
the Brezhnev school and was not known for his tolerance of dissent. Second, 
Aliyev had at his disposal the oil of the Caspian Sea, which could lubricate a 
centrally administered patron-client mode of governance. By 2006, the oil and 
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gas sectors made up 53.8 percent of the GDP and oil products made up 92.8 
percent of exports.25 It is safe to say that oil also accounts for the authoritarian 
rentier state into which Azerbajian transformed itself under Aliyev.
Resource-poor Georgia, on the other hand, relied heavily on foreign 
aid. Since 1993, Georgia has regularly been among the top beneficiaries of 
official development assistance. Part of this success is without doubt due to 
Georgia’s remarkable ability to charmingly present herself as, in principle, a 
very democratic country that is always almost there. Donors reward this self-
representation with unconditioned generosity.
Once again, the situation was different in Armenia, but no more conducive 
to the establishment of a liberal democracy. Central authority was preserved, 
but it was essentially in the hands of those who had successfully organized 
a war and won it against all odds: private entrepreneurs of violence, army 
commanders, and veterans’ organizations (such as Yerkrapah, see above). In 
1998, one of the leading figures of the Karabakh armed resistance, Robert 
Kocharian, became president of Armenia. After years of informal domination, 
this signaled the official takeover of power by the Karabakh clan. Kocharian 
resigned in 2008. His successor is Serzh Sarkisian, former defense minister 
of Karabakh and Kocharian’s preferred candidate. The elections of both 
Kocharian and Sarkisian were, according to international observers, marked 
by irregularities.
This brief analysis of regime reconstruction after 993 points to some 
differences among the three Caucasian republics. Each of them followed a 
distinct trajectory that was shaped by an idiosyncratic confluence of institutional 
legacies and political events. In Armenia, the army was at the core of the rebuilt 
central authority; in Georgia and Azerbaijan, experienced and well-connected 
Soviet power-brokers reconstructed central authority by empowering patron-
client networks. In Azerbaijan, a highly centralized patron-client system 
emerged; in Georgia, the system was more fragmented and less effective.
But on a more general level, the hybrid regimes that have emerged in the 
Caucasus also share many similarities among themselves and arguably also 
with many other hybrid regimes around the world. Most importantly, elites in 
all three countries invested in highly institutionalized yet informal networks 
of patronage, which became the dominant mode of governance. Beginning in 
1993 as the chaos of the civil wars subsided, the first priority of the leadership 
of the newly independent republics was to ensure their political (and even 
physical) survival by establishing some degree of regime stability. In order 
to do so, they established a personalized system of governance and used the 
administration of the Head of State to reestablish a “chain of command,” in 
25 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Azerbaijan: Statistical Appendix,” IMF Country 
Report, no.08/26, July 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ ft/scr/2008/ cr0826.pdf.
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much the same way as the Communist Party leadership had established control 
during the Soviet period. However, this was not an easy task, given that the 
trauma of state collapse and civil war had disrupted the balance of power that 
had prevailed hitherto and had empowered new-and not always particularly 
civil-actors. Old actors and new therefore fought over what remained of the 
countries’ resources; these actors included former party bosses, directors of 
Soviet-era enterprises and collective farms, nationalist leaders, regional elites, 
and (initially) the leaders of official and unofficial militias. Many had the 
potential to act as spoilers and thwart the attempts of the new leadership to 
reestablish central authority.
It was against this backdrop that governance through patron-client 
networks seemed like the only way to reestablish the chain of command. In 
the early days of its rule, the leadership therefore co-opted potential spoilers 
by bringing them into a power-sharing arrangement. Later on, it gradually 
sought to eliminate them, typically by pitting one against the other. Given the 
virtual nonexistence of a formal economy, almost the only way this could be 
done was to develop a powerful network of clients with access to the informal 
economy (typically the smuggling of contraband goods, such as cigarettes, 
alcohol, petroleum, and even drugs and weapons, across the porous borders of 
the three states). If one was excluded from these networks, one’s potential as a 
spoiler gradually diminished.
The states that emerged also relied heavily on Soviet-era modes of 
governance to cement their authority. Both Shevardnadze and Aliyev were 
former party bosses and drew on their old networks to consolidate their 
power. In all three cases, the presidency-whether in the formal sense of the 
presidential administration or informally in terms of the president’s networks-
came to fulfill very much the same functions as the old Central Committee 
and became the dominant branch of power. Local administration also came to 
mirror the former system; despite the establishment of elected local councils, 
these remained subservient to centrally appointed state administrators, in much 
the same way as the local soviets had been subservient to the oblast (province) 
or raion (district) first secretaries of the Communist Party. Like the reliance 
on patron-client networks, the readoption of a centralized Soviet-type model 
of government was the most familiar and available default option for the new 
leaders.
The Soviet period, therefore, left a profound legacy on state-building in the 
mid-990s simply because Soviet-era institutions, networks, and organizational 
forms were familiar and readily available to the new power-holders. The 
institutional legacy of Soviet rule manifested itself in the hierarchical structure 
of the “presidential vertical” and its mechanisms for internal control (see 
below), while the organizational legacy included formal organizations such 
as the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as informal structures such as 
Communist Party and Komsomol networks.
The states that emerged after 995 showed the typical symptoms of weak 
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states: weak formal institutions, high levels of corruption, abundant informality, 
and limited provision of public goods. But this type of state weakness should 
not be confused with the weakness that plagued the Caucasian states at the 
beginning of the 990s, nor should it be equated with a weakness of the 
regime. Many of the symptoms that characterize hybrid regimes as seemingly 
weak states in fact are the product of a strategic decision of elites to apply the 
power of patronage, when coming to terms with the most pressing needs of the 
day: reconstructing a minimal degree of central authority and keeping potential 
challengers at bay.
Democracy is a highly complex system of political rules that is embedded 
in the societal and economic environment on which it is dependent. In the 
case of the Caucasus, this wider environment is characterized by the informal 
mechanisms described above. The type of hybrid democracy that emerged and 
that became embedded in this environment is thus not an accident, a deviation, 
or a defect. Rather, it is precisely the type of regime that would not endanger 
the functionality of its environment.
 
Locked in Limbo? On Revolution and Stability
As we have noted above, the hybrid regimes in the Caucasus (as in other 
former Soviet republics such as Moldova and Kyrgyzstan) have remained 
remarkably stable over the last ten years in terms of the extent (or lack thereof) 
of democratization and have resisted further steps toward liberal democracy, 
despite the investment of significant amounts of foreign donor money in 
democracy-promotion and institutional-reform initiatives. How can this be 
so?
The stability of the hybrid or hybrid-authoritarian regimes of the southern 
Caucasus can be ascribed both to the capacity of patrons to ensure the loyalty 
of their clients within the context of the clientelistic system that defines these 
regimes and to the so-called “stickiness” of institutions, in particular, the 
capacity of the informal rules of the game (or the “way things are done”) to 
survive apparently radical upheavals within the regime. Looking at the first of 
these factors, the loyalty of clients is ensured by an institutionalized system 
of rewards and punishments. Loyalty is rewarded by what can be described 
as a “licence to be corrupt” (i.e., to avoid the formal rules and to tap into 
the lucrative shadow economy). On the other hand, disloyalty is punished, 
often by selectively and arbitrarily applying the law against the culprit. In 
the same vein, the old Soviet-era institution whereby superiors kept files of 
compromising material (kompromat) on their subordinates has been restored 
and reinvigorated. Given that the clientele of the post-Soviet Caucasian 
state is, by definition, involved in some kind of illegal or corrupt act, power-
holders can always find something incriminating to discredit or even prosecute 
disloyal clients. Within this system, corruption, far from being a sign of regime 
weakness, is actually an instrument to ensure regime stability, as the state 
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leadership is able to control its clients and strengthen hierarchical authority.26
On occasions, however, top-level members of the governing elite may think 
themselves well enough protected to defect and to take their own clients with 
them. This occurred in Georgia, when Eduard Shevardnadze, after successfully 
maintaining a balance among various elite factions for five years, began from 
2000 to rely more and more on his close circle of family and friends and on the 
various networks of former Communist Party and Komsomol officials whom 
he had cultivated throughout his long career. The alienation of the younger, 
more Western-oriented faction, led by parliamentary chairman, Zurab Zhvania, 
and justice minister, Mikheil Saakashvili, proved to be a fatal mistake. Relying 
on their close links with the NGO sector and, through them, the financial and 
human resources of Western aid agencies, this group of “young reformers” 
found that they could survive without Shevardnadze’s patronage, eventually 
organizing a successful uprising against his regime.
However, even if the governing elite is replaced by new younger blood, as 
occurred during the Rose Revolution, the old practices or “rules of the game” 
prove harder to eradicate. According to the public utterances of its leaders, the 
Rose Revolution aimed to root out corruption and change the way Georgia 
was governed toward a more Western model of democratic governance. While 
partly successful in the first of the aims, the new regime had, at the time of 
writing, completely failed to achieve the second. 
In essence, the leadership that came into power during Georgia’s Rose 
Revolution withdrew the “license to be corrupt” from most low- and middle-
ranking clients. In return, it rewarded them with an official salary, which, while 
not over-generous, was more or less enough to live on. We continue to refer to 
state bureaucrats as “clients” because the old principles of appointing staff to 
government bodies still remained; the minister would still appoint his “people,” 
who, in turn, would appoint their “people”-friends, relatives, former university 
colleagues, and the like. When the minister moved, resigned, or was dismissed, 
his or her “people” would be replaced by those of his/her replacement. In some 
departments, some basic level of competence was required, and, for the first 
time, examinations were held for certain civil-service posts. Nevertheless, the 
civil service still had a long way to go in its transition from a Shevardnadze-era 
“clientele” to a rational “Weberian” bureaucracy.
The withdrawal of the “license to be corrupt” from most ordinary officials, 
including policemen, tax inspectors, and customs officers, allowed for 
significant increases in the levels of tax collection, which, in turn, permitted 
26 Keith Darden, “Graft and Governance: Corruption as an Informal Mechanism of State Control,” 
unpublished typoscript (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2002). Also see Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi, “Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (2006): 86-
99.
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reasonable basic salaries for civil servants. Table 4 shows how tax collection 
grew as a proportion of the GDP in the ten years from 998 to 2007, and 
indicates an average annual rise of 0.9 percent in the years leading up to the Rose 
Revolution, compared with 2.4 percent subsequently. This was also associated 
with significant reductions in the overall level of corruption. According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Georgia was 
the 24th most corrupt country of 33 surveyed in 2003, with a Corruption 
Perceptions Index of 1.8. By 2007, the country’s rating had improved to 79th 
of 80, with a Corruption Perceptions Index of 3.4.
Nevertheless corruption still persisted at the highest echelons of power, 
and top officials were brought to account for corruption only if their loyalty 
to President Mikheil Saakashvili and his team appeared to be in doubt. The 
most telling case in this respect was that of former defense minister, Irakli 
Okruashvili, who was arrested for corruption and extortion on September 
27, 2007, just two days after he had appeared on television to announce the 
formation of a new opposition party and to accuse President Saakashvili of 
plotting to murder business tycoon, Badri Patarkatsishvili. Okruashvili’s arrest 
came just days after the arrest of one of his clients, Mikheil Kareli, the former 
governor of Shida Kartli province, once again on charges of extortion, just 
days after he had been involved in a clash with the local police and fired from 
his position. The point was not whether Okruashvili and Kareli were guilty of 
extortion; indeed, there was significant evidence that they had been involved in 
wrongdoing, and Kareli, in particular, had been accused by the public defender 
and opposition politicians of tolerating smuggling activities from South Ossetia 
as early as 2004. This incriminating evidence was used against them, however, 
only when they established themselves as opponents of the incumbent regime. 
Table 4. Tax Revenues in the Three Caucasian Republics as a Proportion of GDP
998 999 2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Armenia 3.6 6. 4.8 4.3 4.6 4.0 4. 4.3 4.4 6.
Azerbaijan 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.6 5. 5.4 5.4 5.2 7.8 2.0
Georgia 0.5 .5 .7 2.0 4.4 5.0 8.2 9.8 2.8 24.7
Sources: IMF reports. Armenia: Hamid R. Davoodi and David A. Grigorian, “Tax 
Potential vs. Tax Effort: A Cross-Country Analysis of Armenia’s Stubbornly Low Tax 
Collection,” IMF Working Paper WP/07/06; IMF Country Report No. 07/8 (May 
2007); IMF Country Report No. 08/76 (June 2008). Azerbaijan: IMF Country Report 
No. 03/30 (May 2003); IMF Country Report No. 05/8 (January 2005); IMF Country 
Report No. 08/26 (July 2008). Georgia: IMF Country Report No. 06/7(May 2006); 
IMF Country Report No. 07/07 (March 2007); IMF Country Report No. 07/299 
(August 2007); International Monetary Fund Resident Representative in Georgia, Table 
. Georgia: Consolidated Budget, 2006-2008, http://www.imf.ge/aattach/ 36.xls. All 
country reports are available at www.imf.org.
Note: Figures given for Georgia and Azerbaijan refer to the consolidated budget; for 
Armenia, the state budget.
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The Soviet-era practice of using kompromat to intimidate and silence defectors 
was a mechanism used as much after the Rose Revolution as before. 
More generally, the basic parameters of the Georgian regime remained 
more or less the same after the Rose Revolution as before. The presidency 
remained the principal locus of power and, despite the abolition of the State 
Chancellery, probably became even more powerful than it was before the Rose 
Revolution. Even on paper, the powers of the president were boosted; as a 
result of constitutional amendments passed in February 2004, he now had the 
right to order the preterm dissolution of parliament-a right that Shevardnadze 
never had. More importantly, Saakashvili ruled through a network of close 
confidantes, many of whom had either worked with Saakashvili when he was 
justice minister or had belonged to the NGO sector during the Shevardnadze 
period. Among the latter group, former activists from the Liberty Institute and 
the Open Society-Georgia Foundation (Soros) were prominent. Although 
these individuals may not have held the key posts within official power 
structures, they exercised considerable informal power due to their proximity to 
the president. Similarly, a new “party of power” was established that operated 
according to very much the same clientelistic principles as the old Citizens’ 
Union of Georgia (see above).
Even in terms of basic procedural democracy, Georgia’s progress remained 
uneven. Although the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2008 
represented an improvement on the “high watermark” of vote falsification 
observed in the 2000 presidential elections and the parliamentary elections that 
precipitated the Rose Revolution in November 2003, they were still subject to 
significant procedural violations, and “administrative resources” were used to 
benefit the incumbent president and the “party of power.” Moreover, the results 
of these elections were bitterly contested by the opposition, who refused to 
recognize them. The authorities’ impulse to rule by decree in time-honored 
Soviet style from 2004 to 2008, had widened the gulf between the authorities 
and opposition and made a democratic pact between the two sides-seen by 
some scholars27 as conducive to democratization-virtually inconceivable.
Overall, the formal hierarchical structure of power in Georgia is little 
changed since the Rose Revolution, as ultimate power rests with the president 
and those with formal or informal connections to him. Incentives to remain 
loyal to one’s superior have therefore prevailed over incentives to obey 
formal rules, and informal directives still prevail over formal responsibilities 
within the state bureaucracy. The president continues to enjoy considerable 
informal power, which is greater even than the power he possesses on paper, 
as a statement or telephone call from the president is seen as an order to act. 
27 Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern 
Europe,” International Social Science Journal 28 (99): 269-284.
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As before, parliament will pass a law after an informal wink or nod from the 
president, even on laws it seems incapable of passing under its own initiative 
alone.28
The Georgian example leads us to the conclusion that the unwritten rules 
of power that prevailed both in Shevardnadze’s Georgia and in other hybrid 
or hybrid-authoritarian states in the Caucasus, and that determine how the 
state bureaucracy organizes itself, are “sticky,” or resistant to change.29 In this 
sense, the Rose Revolution was little more than an exercise in “repackaging,” 
in which the faces at the top changed but the rules of the game remained the 
same. This finding suggests that institutions, namely the informal institutional 
structure or “organizational culture” of the state apparatus, are remarkably 
slow to change and prove a major obstacle in transition toward democracy. 
The “stickiness” of institutions, particularly those that determine how power 
is distributed and exercised, means that the new leaders in these states do not 
start with a tabula rasa, but have to contend with power relationships that have 
developed over decades, if not generations. It is this “institutional stickiness” 
that is central to the explanation of why post-Soviet hybrid regimes remain so 
resistant to change.
This is not to deny that the hybrid regimes of the Caucasus have evolved 
over time. We already have seen how the capacity of the Georgian state has 
increased significantly since the Rose Revolution, and more modest increases in 
state capacity have been observed in Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. However, 
greater state capacity has been achieved by increasing the despotic power of the 
state rather than by exploiting the capacity of society (infrastructural power). 
The increases in tax collection in Georgia and, to a lesser extent, in Azerbaijan 
(see table 4) have occurred because economic agents have been forced to hand 
over their revenues under the threat of sanctions from the state-or rather, the 
presidency-but there is still no indication that the obligation to pay taxes is 
becoming a social norm. After Georgia’s Rose Revolution, raids were regularly 
carried out by the tax inspectorate against businesses that were believed to owe 
tax, but this was done by force rather than through negotiations. None of the 
three states as yet has the capacity to penetrate and centrally coordinate the 
activities of civil society through its own infrastructure.
This reflects a fundamental feature of the post-Soviet states in the Caucasus 
(and, indeed, of other post-Soviet states). Regime stability has been maintained 
28 A clear example of this was the adoption of a new Law on Local Self-Government, under 
discussion by parliamentary committees since 2004, but adopted only in 2006 after Saakashvili 
had made it clear what his preferences were.
29 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 990), 6, 37.
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by keeping society out. For the new leadership of post-Soviet states, in the 
990s it was barely feasible to govern through establishing institutional links 
with citizens because such links had not existed during the Soviet period. 
“Civil society,” understood in terms of reciprocity in the flow of information 
and ideas between society and government, was simply lacking. Building 
a regime by establishing infrastructural power was therefore not an option. 
Moreover, the new elites did not see society as a partner but as a potential 
threat. In part, this was a reflection of the mindset of a Soviet bureaucrat, but 
more importantly, “society” was associated with the mass uprisings of the late 
980s, or with the militias-or “uncivil society”-of the early 990s. For the 
elites of newly independent states, society was to be bribed, threatened, or 
repressed, but not engaged.
The result was that political elites’ reliance on patron-client networks led to 
the disembedding of the political and economic elites from the rest of society. 
The primary cleavage within society in the Caucasus (and, more generally, 
throughout much of the former USSR) was not between different social classes 
in the way most sociologists have come to understand them, or even between 
different regions or “clans,” but between the tiny fraction of the population that 
constituted the political and economic elite and the rest of society. This system 
was stable, but could never be democratic.
Conclusion
Almost two decades after the crumbling of the Soviet empire sent Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan on the bumpy road of political transition, these 
three states have emerged as rather consolidated hybrid states, albeit one 
with a strong authoritarian “coloring” in the case of Azerbaijan. While there 
are considerable differences among the three, all three regimes appear to be 
locked in limbo-there is no significant movement to worse authoritarianism 
or to better democratization. Measured by Freedom House Nations in Transit 
Democracy scores, all changes since 997 have stayed within a small corridor 
of about one point.
This essay presented some insights into two related questions: First, what 
are the origins of the hybrids, and second, why are they so stable? We have 
described the trajectories of the three countries since 989 at some length. 
Tracing the historical process since the collapse of the Soviet Union reveals, 
above all, that there are different paths to “hybridity.”
In Georgia, the challenging nationalist elites were radicalized and highly 
noncohesive, the opposition strong but internally fragmented, and the new 
elites challenged by the counter-mobilization of two ethnic minorities. As a 
consequence, the new regime could not consolidate, and Georgia experienced 
a series of bitter civil wars. It was a seasoned Soviet power-broker who put bits 
and pieces together, relying on the power of clientelist networks.
In Armenia, the war for Karabakh acted as an irresistible mobilizing force, 
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bridged rifts between incumbents and challengers, and assured widespread 
popular support. But it also placed political power in the hands of a small 
elite, tightly connected with the army and security forces that used its political 
influence to severely restrict political competition.
Finally, in Azerbaijan, the power relation between incumbents and 
challengers favored the former. The national movement was strong enough 
to challenge incumbents, but it was not strong enough to stay in power and 
consolidate the regime. The protracted political fight between the communist 
elite and its national challengers between 989 and 993 eroded the institutional 
base for democratic governance. Eventually, it was Heidar Aliyev, another 
Soviet power-broker, who took over and built the “system Aliyev,” a highly 
personalized rentier state, which lasts to the present day.
Clearly, in the emergence of hybrids in the Caucasus, equifinality (the 
principle that similar results may be achieved with different initial conditions 
and in many different ways) is present. This is often a somewhat frustrating 
finding for political scientists, who like to find clear associations between 
causal factors and the observed outcome across many cases. Yet, as we have 
shown, some of the most prominent factors-ethnic demography, strength of 
ethnic identity, strength of nationalist mobilization, and direction of nationalist 
mobilization-are not systematically associated with the outcome. Instead, 
it was mainly the conflict dynamic in each country among the incumbent 
(communist) power-holders, the nationalist opposition, and the elites of the 
autonomous territories, as well as the way these conflicts were played out and 
the rules by which they were played, that determined the transition path from 
communism to post-communism.
In terms of the debate as to whether it is primarily actors that determine the 
dynamics and outcome of political transition30 or whether, instead, it is cultural, 
socioeconomic, or institutional preconditions,3 our argument so far would 
seem to suggest that both are important. Structural legacies-institutional, 
organizational, and societal-determined the room for maneuvre within which 
the leaderships of the newly independent republics were able to operate. 
30 Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” 
269-284. Also see Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 986).
3 Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 963). Also see Larry Diamond, 
“Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 35, 
nos. 4-5 (992): 450-499; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 
expanded edition (New York: Doubleday, 1960); and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems 
of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 996).
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Many of these structures were holdovers-or reconstructions-from the Soviet 
period. However, there was still room for political actors to innovate, scheme, 
and blunder. The disastrous decision made by the communist leadership of 
Georgia (with the backing of Moscow) in April 989 to use force against 
unarmed demonstrators undoubtedly radicalized the population and may have 
paved the way for the emergence of the demagogic leader Gamsakhurdia and 
the civil strife with which he was associated, further complicating prospects 
for a democratic transition. Similarly, the guile with which Shevardnadze 
and Aliyev were able to bring order to their broken countries helped build 
the relatively stable regimes that prevailed after 995. Finally, the personal 
characteristics of the more “enlightened” Shevardnadze, in contrast with the 
“autocrat” Aliyev, probably played a key role in making Georgia a “better 
reformer” than Azerbaijan.
However, if we move up the ladder of generalization, we can at least 
identify three important “interstations” on the different paths to “hybridity.” 
The first is the fact that new elites in Georgia and Azerbaijan (to a lesser extent 
in Armenia) were for various idiosyncratic reasons not able to consolidate 
their regimes between 989 and 993. The period between 988 and 993 was 
marked by intense political competition, fought mostly outside institutional 
avenues. As a consequence, the infrastructural base for governance further 
eroded. This is in sharp contrast to the Baltic states, where cohesive elites, 
supported by broad societal consensus, quickly consolidated their regimes and 
reconstructed state capacities. Second, when in 993 Caucasian elites started 
again to rebuild their polities, they had to do so without being able to rely 
on infrastructural state capacities. The turmoil between 988 and 993 had 
destroyed what little state capacity was left from the Soviet period. Third, this 
led elites in all three countries to invest in highly institutionalized yet informal 
networks of patronage, which became the dominant mode of governance. 
As a result, rent-seeking behavior, corruption, a dominant executive, and a 
dependent judiciary became endemic.
What then, in the light of our analysis, are the prospects for change? We 
are tempted to say that they are rather slim. The trend of stagnation that is 
reflected in the Freedom House scores seems to underline this. We are also 
tempted to argue that the consolidation of hybrid regimes should not actually 
be depicted as a sort of “blockade” (which implies that one needs only to 
remove a few parts and the rest will fall into its democratic place), but rather 
as an equilibrium outcome: On the one hand, the perpetuation of the patronage 
system requires that the environment in which the system operates is adapted 
to ensure the functionality of the patronage system. On the other hand, internal 
and external constraints require that some aspects of democracy are retained.
As Levitsky and Way argue, liberal hegemony placed a “web of 
constraints” on nondemocratic governments that seek to maintain international 
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respectability and viability.32 Such regimes face some pressure to tolerate a 
free press, a parliamentary opposition, and an independent judiciary. They 
also have to accept election monitoring. This all holds true for the Caucasus. 
In addition, Georgia is dependent on foreign aid and courts Western support 
in its ambitions to join NATO, while Armenia relies on the generosity of the 
Armenian Diaspora in the United States, which would not like to see a fully 
autocratic Armenia. Even Azerbaijan, the most reluctant reformer, is a member 
of the Council of Europe and would like to eventually integrate more closely 
into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Furthermore, elites in the Caucasus face some political opposition and, 
on occasions, an active network of campaigning NGOs that have proven their 
mobilizing capacity. Fully repressing both might be beyond the capacity of 
the elites. Besides, there is no need to do so, because the political opposition, 
while it may be able to block attempts at moves toward full authoritarianism, is 
in all three countries too weak to threaten the political dominance of the small 
incumbent elite.
However, at the same time, there are relatively few strong external 
incentives for the Caucasian elites to become more democratic: the lure of 
EU accession, which proved to be a highly effective means for promoting 
democracy in the Baltic and Balkan regions, is not extended to the Caucasus. 
And Russia, still by far the most important regional player, is not known for its 
democracy-promotion agenda.
Given these specific internal and external constraints-the need to 
perpetuate the patronage system, the need to partially placate the demands of 
the “liberal hegemony,” the relative weakness of the opposition, Russia’s role 
and the weakness of the “European option”-the degree of democracy that 
these hybrids have reached may be at an equilibrium outcome. Since none of 
these constraints is apt to dramatically change in the near future, there is a high 
likelihood that the Caucasian states will continue to be hybrid regimes for a 
long time to come.
32 Levitsky and Way, “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 
62.
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